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IDENTITY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW INFORMATION
SCALPERS: RECALIBRATING THE RULES OF
THE ROAD IN THE AGE OF THE INFOBAHN:

A RESPONSE TO FRED H. CATE

RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.-

Bernard:
John:

Oh Brave New World that has such people in it. Let's start
at once.
Hadn't you better wait till you actually see the new world?'
INTRODUCTION

Professor Fred Cate makes a powerful and cogent argument against the
adoption of European-style privacy regulations in the United States.2 To the
extent that Professor Cate rests his argument against the adoption of privacy
regulations modeled on the European Union's approach solely on policy-based
grounds, he makes some important, indeed powerful, points. There is, as
Professor Cate suggests, good cause to think that the European Union's approach
overvalues individual privacy interests at the expense of facilitating commerce.3
Even if this is so, however, one might question whether Professor Cate's
preferred approach to privacy protection in the United States-reliance on market
forces to protect privacy interests-is sufficient to the task at hand. Reasonable
minds can and will differ as to whether the market predictably will vindicate the
legitimate privacy expectations of the citizenry.
Recent events, such as Amazon.com's "fun" practice of releasing employerby-employer information about employees' purchases from the company,4 or the

*

Paul Beam Research Fellow and Associate Professor ofLaw, Indiana University School

of Law-Indianapolis. I wish to thank Professors Gary Spitko, Michael Heise, Dan Cole, Betsy
Wilborn Malloy, and Lyrissa Lidsky for providing very helpful comments and suggestions on an
earlier draft of.this Essay. As always, any errors or omissions are mine alone.
1. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 165-66 (1946); cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
TEMPEST, act 5, sc. 1,at 124 (Frank Kenmode ed., 6th ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1958) (Miranda
speaking, "0, wonder!fHow many goodly creatures are there here!/How beauteous mankind is! 0
brave new world/That has such people in it!). In my view, Huxley's caution is far more prudent
than Shakespeare's blind, unreflective enthusiasm.
2. See Fred H. Cate, The ChangingFace ofPrivacyProtectionin the EuropeanUnion and
the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173 (1999).
3. See id. at 180-95, 225-30.
4. See David Streitfeld, Who's Reading What? Using Powerful "Data Mining"
Technology,Amazon.com Stirs an Internet Controversy,WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1999, at Al. This
is hardly innocent. Suppose that employees were afficiandos of Scott Adams' Dilbert cartoons or
were purchasing mass quantities of How to Spruce Up Your Resume titles? All things being equal,
an employee Would probably prefer that her employer not have ready access to her reading, music,
or video tastes. For a discussion of the market's failure adequately to protect reasonable privacy
expectations, see Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: A Work in
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practice of telephone companies selling information about their customers to
third parties,5 raise serious doubts about the wisdom of trusting privacy
protection to the invisible hand's not-so-tender mercies. Moreover, whatever the
wisdom of federal or state legislation protecting individual privacy interests, I
disagree quite strongly with Professor Cate's assertions about the legal authority
of the federal or state governments to enact such laws. 6 As this Essay will
explain more fully below, the Bill of Rights should not be read to preclude the
vindication of reasonable privacy interests through appropriate iegislation, even
if restrictions protecting the confidentiality of personal information incidentally
burden commercial speech or information gathering practices associated with
commercial speech."
In this era of technological marvels, of virtual reality and e-commerce, it is
all too easy to become enamored of the obvious (and highly touted) benefits of
technology, without giving careful consideration to the costs associated with the
introduction of new technologies on society generally and on each of us
individually. Indeed, the German existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger
deeply distrusted technology following the turn of the last century.8 Despairing
of modernity and its focus on the here and now, he took to wearing the garb of
a Bavarian peasant and fled to the hills (quite literally to a secluded cabin in the
depths of the Black Forest).9
Heidegger warned thattechnology threatened what he called the "Enframing"
of "Being."'" By this, he meant that as technology increased the pace of
everyday life, people would find less and less time for meaningful reflection;
individuals would live in the world of mundane tasks (bus to be caught, report to
be filed) rather than "authentically," which for Heidegger meant living every
moment with some consciousness of one's own mortality." To the extent that
the wonders of technology lead us to forget the blunt reality of our mortality,

Progress,23 NOVA L. REV. 552, 563-68 (1999).
5. See Shu Shin Luh, FCCto FightRulingon CustomerData,WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1999,
at E2.
6. See infra Part II.A-B.
7. See infra Part I.A-B.
8. See Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in THE QUESTION
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3-35 (William Lovitt trans., Garland 1977)
[hereinafter The Question ConcerningTechnology]; Martin Heidegger, The Turning Point,in id.
at 38-49 [hereinafter The Turning].
9.

See RUDIGER SAFRANSKI, MARTIN HEIDEGGER: BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL 131, 185-86

(Ewald Osers trans., Harv. Univ. 1998).
10. The Question ConcerningTechnology, supranote 8, at 25-28; The Turning,supra note
8, at 37-41, 48-49.
11. Heidegger referred to this as "authentic" Being-that is to say, making choices and
living with the consequences of these choices with full and actualized knowledge that one has only
a limited period of time in which to exercise the power of choice in light of the certainty of death.
See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEINGAND TIME 78-86, Ch. 1,Pt. 2, §§ 12, 293-311, Ch. II, Pt. 1,§§ 5053 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962).
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technology robs us of our ability to make good choices (that is to say, choices
that we would make if we reflected about a particular matter in light of our own
mortality).
More recently, Theodore Kaczynski embraced a neo-Heideggerian world
view and went about destroying the purveyors of technology with mail bombs.
Kaczynski, of course, is a deluded madman, who saw violence as the only means
of reasserting human control over a world that seemed (to Kaczynski) to be
defined and controlled by technology. 2 Like Heidegger, Kaczynski feared that
society would permit technology to define our humanity rather than harness
technology to accomplish tasks selected independently of technology's ability to
accomplish them. 3
In Kaczynski's view, "[t]he industrial revolution and its consequences have
been a disaster for the human race," and "[t]he continued development of
technology will worsen the situation."' 4 He goes on to explain that "[t]he15
technophiles are taking us all on an utterly reckless ride into the unknown."'
to nature
Consistent with Heidegger's philosophy, Kaczynski advocates a return
16
because "[n]ature makes a perfect counter-ideal to technology."'
I deplore Kaczynski's action plan and believe that, not unlike the Luddites
before him, he did a great deal more harm than good for his cause. Similarly, I
rather doubt that dressing in Bavarian peasant garb and taking to the hills
represents an acceptable plan of action for dealing with the new problems and
challenges that technology presents. If those of us who severely mistrust the
Microsofts of the world, who inevitably pop up every few months bearing new
upgrades, choose to disengage and withdraw from the fray, new technologies
simply will grow unchecked like weeds. Moreover, the consequences of those
technologies will be considered systematically only after they have altered the
basic chemistry of our society. 7 As the saying goes, once released, it is difficult
to put the genie back into the bottle.
It is therefore essential that we ask hard questions of those who would lead
us into a brave new world before agreeing to make the journey. Before we

12. See Martin Gottlieb, Pattern Emerges in Bombing Tract, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1995, at
AI; Robert D. McFadden, Times and the Washington Post Grant Mail Bomber Demand, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at Al; see also THEODORE J. KACZYNSKI, UNABOMBER MANIFESTO:
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND ITS FUTURE (1996).
13. See KACZYNSKI, supranote 12. The Washington Postpublished Kaczynski'sManifesto
in full on Tuesday, September 19, 1995, as a supplement to its regular edition. See FC, Industrial
Society and Its Future,WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1995. For a more concise version of Kaczynski's
position on technology, see Excerpts from Manuscript Linked to Suspect in 17-Year Series of
Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995, at AI6.
14. KACZYNSKI, supra note 12, at I 1.
15. Id. at 29, 180; see also id. at 20-22.
16. Id. at 29, 184.
17. See ELIZABETH EINSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE (1979); M.
Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera,Action: CyberspatialSettings andthe FirstAmendment, 104 YALE
L.J. 1681, 1685-92, 1703-17 (1995).
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blithely embrace the ostensible benefits of gizmos and programs that allow us to
do things cheaper, faster, and better (or so we are supposed to believe), we must
first demand answers to serious questions about the desirability of such devices
and their potential social costs.
Technology for technology's sake is no virtue, and a healthy appreciation for
the accomplishments of the past (and the means used to achieve them) is no
vice.' 8 Perhaps synthesizers and computer-assisted musical composition will lead
us into a new and wonderful world in which Mozarts, Beethovens, and Verdis
abound. You will have to pardon me if I express some doubts about this; for it
seems that one of the necessary consequences of technology is homogenization
and standardization. A program that assists a composer in creating a bar of music
assists every composer using the same lines of code; it undoubtedly makes
composing easier, but there is likely to be a good deal of sameness to the
resulting compositions.
Similarly, mass production and technology allow anyone with a few hundred
dollars to own a perfectly executed piece ofjewelry. One wonders, though, if
these technologies will give us the wonders that Faberge wrought for the Tsars?
At least arguably, the homogenizing effects of technology make it less likely that
someone with the talent of a Faberge will fully realize that talent.
If one looks to many of the great works of art or literature, they are the
product of great suffering and a society that presented hardships and challenges.
Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel is not the product ofJava graphics-nor do I think
it ever could be. Richard Wright's Native Son could only have been conceived
and executed by someone who had lived through the horrors and depredations of
Mississippi in the Jim Crow era. Make no mistake, I am not arguing that we
should work to create a world in which prejudice, sickness, and death are
commonplace because an artist's reaction to such conditions can give rise to
works of power and beauty. Rather, I am simply suggesting that the convenience
and comfort that technology often bring may entail greater difficulty in creating
works that are, for better or worse, in part a product of the social conditions
extant at the time of their creation.
I. DRAWING THE BATTLE LINES

It is time to draw some battle lines-to challenge the unquestioned march of
technology into our lives. To the extent that technology helps us to do things that
we freely seek to accomplish, it is a powerful friend. On the other hand, to the
extent that purveyors of technology seek to force us to change the way we go
about being in the world in order to accommodate a new technology, to the extent
that we are forced to change who we are and how we go about our daily lives

18.

See

LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE!:

ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF

REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (1979) (discussing the potential social impact of new medical

technologies and procedures with particular attention to cloning); GEORGE ANNAS, SOME CHOICE:
LAW, MEDICINE AND THE MARKET 3-79, 249-59 (1998) (discussing the ethical questions raised by
new medical technologies and procedures).
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solely in order to accommodate a new technology, we have a legitimate
complaint with the seemingly ceaseless forward march of modernity.
Privacy presents one of these "quo vadis" social questions: Shall we permit
our identities to be bundled and sold like sacks of potatoes, or rather shall we
demand some protection from the power of technology to collect and sell data
about everything from where we bank, to what we earn, to what we watch on
cable television? As Professor Cate says, the need to have such a debate "is
prompted largely by extraordinary technological innovations that are
dramatically expanding both the practical ability to collect and use personal data
and the economic incentive to do so."'" Moreover, he correctly posits that "[t]he
ramifications of such a readily accessible storehouse of electronic information
are astonishing: others know more about you---even things you may not know
about yourself-than ever before."2
Given this state of affairs, it seems crucial that citizens demand protection
against the involuntary dissemination of confidential information of this sort.2
Neither my physician nor my banker should enjoy the legal right to sell
information about my physical or financial health. Traditionally, tort law has
prohibited the public disclosure of private facts.2" There is no reason that
Congress, state legislatures, and state supreme courts should not apply this
traditional common law rule to prevent the unauthorized transfer of highly
personal information from those providing particular goods or services.23
Indeed, in a variety of contexts, Congress and state governments have acted
to protect the privacy of personal information. The Buckley Amendment, also
known as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA"), prohibits
an educational institution from publicly releasing either academic or disciplinary
records without the consent of the student.24 Violations of the Act are punishable
with the offending institution's loss of all federal education funds.2" Similarly,

19. Cate, supra note 2, at 175-76.
20. Id. at 178.
21. Cf.James Lardner, I Know What You DidLastSummer-andFall,U.S.NEWS& WORLD
REP., Apr. 19, 1999, at 55 (reporting that "[c]orporate America is mobilizing against the threat of
a broad federal privacy-protection law.").
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1965); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky,
Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73
TULANE L. REV. 173, 198-203 (1998) (describing the nature and scope of the "private facts tort").
23. It is true that, as to media disclosures, the Supreme Court has severely limited the
potential applicability of the private facts tort. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989);
Lidsky, supra note 22, at 200-01. Of course, those collecting private information of the sort to
which Professor Cate is adverting have absolutely no intention of publishing their lists-doing so
would destroy the economic value of the database. Rather, information brokers seem much more
analogous to Dun & Bradstreet, a financial reporting service, which did not generally make its
analyses available to the general public. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
24. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994).
25. See § 1232g(a).
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most states have enacted statutes protecting the identity of persons tested for the
AIDS virus.26 One can imagine all sorts of marketing opportunities associated

with a such a list-everything from birth control devices to viatical settlement
plans might be direct-marketed to persons having taken an AIDS test. For better
or worse (in my view for better), those providing such test services cannot profit
by selling the names of clients to entities wishing to direct-market to them, even
if they maintain a database containing the names of such persons.
Viewed from this perspective, the only real question is whether Congress,
state legislatures, and state supreme courts will act to protect us from one of the
more profoundly negative consequences of living in the information age.
Professor Cate, however, does not think that such legislation could be enacted
and enforced constitutionally: "In the United States, however, the government
is constitutionally prohibited under the First Amendment from interfering with
the flow of information, except in the most compelling circumstances."" For the
reasons set forth below, I think he is unduly pessimistic about the possibility of
securing appropriate legislation protecting private facts from public disclosure.
That said, I am far from convinced that government will act to protect the
citizenry's reasonable expectations of privacy.2"
II. REASONABLE FEDERAL OR STATE LEGISLATION PROTECTING
AN INDIVIDUAL'S PRIVACY WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL

Professor Cate argues that efforts to protect personal information are
somehow doomed by the First Amendment right of those collecting such

information to disseminate it, or alternatively that such regulation might raise
serious issues under the Takings Clause.29 Notwithstanding Professor Cate's
objections, with respect to average citizens living average lives, the government
could, if it wished, secure a great deal more information against commodification
and sale than present law protects.
Moreover, one reasonably could take strong issue with Professor Cate's view
that markets will sufficiently protect private information from commodification
and sale.30 In most instances, disparities of bargaining power will make it

26. See, e.g., Doe v. Shady Grove Adventist Hosp., 598 A.2d 507, 514 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991) (upholding request for plaintiff's name to remain under seal in lawsuit alleging that hospital
breached a duty to hold the results of an AIDS test confidential); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 120975-121020 (Supp. 1999); MASs GEN. L. ch. I ll, § 70F (1992); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 81.103 (Vernon 1992).
27. Cate, supra note 2, at 179-80.
28. See Lardner, supra note 21, at 55 (reporting that "corporate lobbyists have sold
Republican and Democratic leaders alike on the view of the Internet economy as a tender, if vital,
young thing needing protection from, in the words of George Vradenburg, senior vice president for
global and strategic policy of America Online, 'the regulatory mechanisms of the past."').
29. See Cate, supra note 2, at 196-225.
30. See id. at 225 ("In those and similar situations, the law provides important but carefully
circumscribed, basic privacy rights, the purpose of which is to facilitate-not interfere with-the
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difficult, if not impossible, for individual citizens to demand that service
providers or merchants refrain from distributing highly personal information. As
one commentator has wryly observed, reliance on market mechanisms and selfregulation to protect privacy is tantamount to "putting Count Dracula in charge
of the blood bank.'
Accordingly, government action is needed to secure basic privacy rights.
Just as the National Labor Relations Act was necessary to ensure parity of arms
in negotiations between workers and management, so too legislation is needed
to secure parity of bargaining power between the general public and the new
information brokers. If left to the market, working class Americans would be at
a considerable disadvantage in disputes with management over the terms and
conditions of their employment,32 if left to the market, basic expectations of
privacy will not be routinely honored.33 Just as laborers are free to waive their
collective bargaining rights, individuals might choose to waive privacy
protections. The existence of privacy protections should not, however, be left to
the tender, mercies of the market (just as basic rights
to collective bargaining
34
should not be, and are not, left to market forces).
A. The FirstAmendment
Professor Cate argues that the Free Speech and Press Clauses of the First
Amendment would preclude the adoption of reasonable privacy legislation." His
position overstates the First Amendment value of facilitating open markets in
highly confidential information about non-public figures that does not implicate
matters of public concern. Simply put, the First Amendment value in distributing
highly personal information about average citizens is, at best, very low.36 For
example, the First Amendment value in permitting an insurance company to sell
an average citizen's medical records is slight. The medical records of a sitting
President might present a harder question; the President is the ultimate "public
figure," and the condition of his health is, at least arguably, a matter of public

development of private mechanisms and individual choice as the preferred means of valuing and
protecting privacy."); cf Berman & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 563-79 (describing the market's
failure adequately to protect reasonable privacy expectations and proposing legislative remedies to
correct these market failures).
31. Lardner, supra note 21, at 56 (quoting Stephen Lau, Hong Kong's "privacy
commissioner").

32. For an example of how markets treated workers inone sector of the economy at the turn
of the last century, see UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
33.

See, e.g., Streitfeld, supra note 4, at 1, 11 (reporting on Amazon.com's practice of

publishing information about customers' buying habits without the overt and freely-given consent
of its customers).
34. See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 571-79.
35. See Cate, supra note 2, at 203-05.
36. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985).
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concern. 37 In this regard, one should keep in mind that the Supreme Court's
efforts to protect the free flow of information generally have been limited to
information about public figures or matters of public concern. Purely private
matters relating to non-public figures are not the subject of serious First
Amendment protection. 38 Hence, if John falsely tells his co-workers that Jane
has syphilis, John will be liable in tort for defamation for his slanderous
statement about Jane. If Jane is a non-public figure and her health status is not
a matter of public concern, Jane need only show that the statement was false and
was "of and concerning" her. Indeed, in most states, stating that someone has a
"loathsome" disease is slanderous per se, and damages are presumed at law.39
Professor Cate is correct, of course, in noting that vast areas of state tort law
have been constitutionalized by New York Times Co.4 and its jurisprudential
progeny.4 1 He argues that "when information is true and obtained lawfully, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the state may not restrict its publication
without showing a very closely tailored, compelling government interest."42
State tort law has not, however, been entirely displaced by First Amendment
values. Indeed, Dun & Bradstreet's inaccurate assertion that a construction
company had filed for bankruptcy led to ajudgment for damages against Dun and
Bradstreet. Predictably, Dun & Bradstreet argued that the mistake should not
give rise to liability, except under the "actual malice" standard of New York
Times Co.43
The Supreme Court correctly rejected Dun & Bradstreet's First Amendment
defense. Writing for the plurality, Justice Powell explained that an inaccurate
credit rating neither implicated a public figure nor a matter of public concern. "4
He also noted that the Supreme Court has "long recognized that not all speech is
of equal First Amendment importance."4' More specifically, "speech on matters
of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern" than speech
related to the project of democratic self-governance.4 6
Moreover, Justice Powell emphatically rejected Dun & Bradstreet's
argument that the dissemination of credit reports constituted an important
enterprise related to matters of public concern: "There is simply no credible

37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
38. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762-64.
39. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 570 (1938).
40. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. See Cate, supra note 2, at 203-05.
42. Id.at 204.
43. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 75 1. This standard requires a plaintiff to show that
the defendant not only published a false and damaging statement about the plaintiff, but that it did
so either with actual knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. See also
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
44. See Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 760, 762.
45. Id. at 758.
46. Id. at 759; see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 22-27 (1948).

1999]

RECALIBRATING THE RULES OF THE ROAD

argument that this type of credit reporting requires special protection to ensure
that 'debate on public issues will be uninhibited, robust, and wide open."' 47
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connorjoined Justice Powell's opinion, and Chief
Justice Burger and Justice White concurred in the judgment-including Justice
Powell's rejection of any special First Amendment protection for credit reports.4 8
The reasoning of Dun & Bradstreetstrongly suggests that the states are far
from powerless to prevent the unauthorized collection and distribution of
personal information when such collection and distribution is potentially harmful
to the subjects of the information. Accordingly, the state of Vermont was free
to impose liability on any standard requiring a showing of fault.
Although one should be cautious against reading too much into Dun &
Bradstreet,the case seems to support the proposition that state legislatures and
the Federal Congress could enact legislation that protects private information
from collection and/or disclosure without the permission of the person about
whom the information relates.49 The specific information in Dun & Bradstreet

47. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 762 (quotations and citation omitted); see MEIKLEJOHN,
supra note 46, at 24-25.
48. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763-64 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id at 765-74
(White, J., concurring).
49. Professor Cate correctly notes that the Supreme Court "has struck down laws restricting
the publication of confidential public reports, and the names ofjudges under investigation,juvenile
suspects, and rape victims." Cate, supra note 2, at 204 (citations omitted). These precedents may
not support his broader argument, however. For example, New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (197 1), a.k.a. "The Pentagon Papers Case," involved an executive order (not a statute)
against publication of "information whose disclosure would endanger the national security," based
on "the constitutional power of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority
as Commander-in-Chief' (not the imposition of liability after the fact, pursuant to statutory law).
See id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring). Several justices were quite careful to emphasize this very
point. See id. at 727-31 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 731-40 (White, J., concurring); id. at 74348 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Cases involving public officials or matters of public concern are also
inapposite. See Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 756-63. This leaves FloridaStar,the case involving
publication of a rape victim's name in violation of a state statute. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524 (1989).
Although FloridaStar might raise some questions regarding restrictions on the print media's
publication of such materials, in the absence of publication, one reasonably could be skeptical that
FloridaStar would necessarily govern. Indeed, given that FloridaStar involved criminal charges
in the public courts, it would be very easy to limit the reasoning of the case and its precedential
value, given the Supreme Court's consistent practice of requiring that the press enjoy reasonable
access to public court proceedings and the right to report on such proceedings. See, e.g., Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976). The Supreme Court has been much less receptive to claims involving a right to gather
information, when the information gathering techniques violate laws of general applicability. See
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The
Supreme Court also has permitted the imposition of liability on the press for breaching a promise
of confidentiality on general principles of state tort and/or contract law. See Cohen v. Cowles
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was, of course, false, and therefore outside Professor Cate's assertion about the
nature of contemporary First Amendment law. Nevertheless, the states or
Congress could enact privacy-protection laws that limit the legal means of
obtaining information about non-public figures involving matters that are not of
public concern.5"
Take, for example, the information associated with the processing of health
insurance claims. If Indiana wished to enact a statute prohibiting the transfer of
such information without a patient's consent, it is difficult to believe that the
First Amendment would prevent the enforcement of such a law. 5 That is to say,
the state could enact legislation that precludes an insurance company or HMO
from disclosing such information without a patient's or plan participant's prior
consent.
In many respects, laws shielding the identity of persons testing positive for
AIDS are similar in nature. In order to encourage persons to seek testing and
treatment for HIV, many communities have adopted privacy laws that prohibit
the disclosure of test results to anyone but the patient.52 The First Amendment
does not preclude state or local governments from preventing testing agencies
from selling lists of persons who tested positive for the virus.
Although a privacy law protecting the confidentiality of medical records
more generally would be significantly broader in scope, such legislation would
not necessarily fail judicial review. The core concern of the First Amendment
is democratic self-governance, not the marketing of medical goods or services.53
It also seems self-evident that protection of commercial speech does not
necessarily imply a right to disclose otherwise confidential information. "Drink
Coca-Cola" is quite different from buying a list of persons with halitosis and
mailing them information on "The Halitosis Connection Dating Service" (the
"HCDS"). Although HCDS could undoubtedly advertise its services without
government censorship, its ability to collect and use confidential private
information incident to such marketing efforts presents a very different question.
Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that privacy rights exist independent of
particular statutory protections. Thus, if Blue Cross/Blue Shield decided to sell
Halitosis Connection a list of persons receiving reimbursements or subsidies for
drugs associated with treating halitosis, there would be no impediment to the
transaction absent some positive legislation. In this sense, Professor Cate is quite
correct to assert that, absent some positive law delimiting the right to obtain or
distribute particular information, Blue Cross/Blue Shield would be perfectly

Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); see also Lidsky, supra note 22, at 184-93, 200-01.
50. See Lidsky, supra note 22, at 203-26 (arguing that legal limits on newsgathering
techniques are consistent with the First Amendment and suggesting the tort of intrusion as an
appropriate device to limit intrusive newsgathering techniques).
51. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665(1972); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501
U.S. 663 (1991).
52. See sources cited supra note 25.

53.

See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 46, at 25-27.
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entitled to sell lists of persons with halitosis to would-be marketers.54 As against
purely private companies, privacy protections exist only by operation of
legislation creating privacy interests." That said, a rational legislature could

conclude that certain information is sufficiently personal to warrant the
protection of legislation (i.e., statutes protecting the identities of persons testing
positive for HIV, tuberculosis, or other communicable and socially stigmatizing
diseases).56
With regard to lawyer solicitations, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld
complete bans on in-person solicitations and even permitted the imposition of
time delays before written solicitations can be mailed to the victims of accidents
and disasters. 7 In upholding restrictions on truthful, non-misleading written
solicitations, the Court credited Florida's interest in protecting accident victims
from the trauma of vulture-like lawyer behavior; the lawyer's interest in
communicating truthful information to potential plaintiffs was insufficient to
outweigh a kind of privacy interest on the part of victims.5"
The Florida Bar expressly defended the prohibition on soliciting disaster
victims on privacy grounds: "The Florida Bar asserts that it has a substantial
interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and
their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers." 9 The
Supreme Court had "little trouble crediting the Bar's interest as substantial,"
explaining that "[o]ur precedents leave no room for doubt6°that 'the protection of
potential clients' privacy is a substantial state interest."'
One should note that, like Justice Powell in Dun & Bradstreet, Justice
O'Connor emphasized that the scope of First Amendment protection is
intrinsically related to the nature of the speech at issue. Hence, "[t]here are
circumstances in which we will accord speech by attorneys on public issues and
matters of legal representation the strongest protection our Constitution has to
offer."'' According to the majority, direct mail solicitations to the victims of
disasters and their families fell well outside this category of speech activity. 62
Although one might question whether the trauma of receiving a lawyer's
solicitation letter is as great as Justice O'Connor seems to believe, the logic of
Went For It should squarely apply to legislation aimed at protecting the
54. See Lidsky, supra note 22, at 193-98; see also S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the
Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REv. 825, 832-38,
862-66, 879-86 (1998) (describing the absence of privacy protections against non-governmental
employees and proposing federal legislation to extend reasonable privacy protections to employees
of non-governmental employers).
55. See Wilborn, supra note 54, at 879-87.

56.

See id. at 876-83.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
See id. at 624-26, 634-35.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625 (quoting Edenfied v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993)).
Id. at 634.
See id. at 635.

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:233

confidentiality of highly personal information.
Indeed, if Professor Cate is correct, educational institutions should be free
to sell information regarding their students' academic progress. Undoubtedly,
Stanley Kaplan or some other entity offering tutoring services would appreciate
a list of students currently on the brink of academic probation. Of course, the
Buckley Amendment would prevent Indiana University from selling such
information to Stanley Kaplan. Professor Cate, however, seems to be of the view
that a law largely identical to the Buckley Amendment would potentially violate
the First Amendment.63 I think it very doubtful that a reviewing court would
absolve Indiana University of liability under the Buckley Amendment if this
school's dean, Norman Lefstein, elected to sell student academic records to
would-be marketers. The analysis should not be any different just because an
Internet service provider happens to be the information broker.
Professor Cate responds that the Supreme Court has never upheld limits on
the dissemination of truthful speech." As he puts it, "all of the cases [Professor
Krotoszynski] puts forward as supporting government restraints on information
involve false expression."" This issimply not true: Went for It upholds
limitations on truthful, non-misleading commercial speech by lawyers in order
to vindicate important privacy interests.66 Justice O'Connor's opinion in Went
for It expressly balances the community's interest in privacy against the value of
certain commercial solicitations by lawyers and holds that the State of Florida
may constitutionally strike a balance in favor of privacy at the expense of
commercial speech (at least in some circumstances).67 Professor Cate is free to
lament this turn in the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence, but it does not
seem reasonable simply to deny the existence of the precedent Went For It
establishes in this field.68

63. See Cate, supra note 2, at 203-05.
64. See id at 173 n.*.
65. Id.
66. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
67. See Went For It., 515 U.S. at 634-35.
68. Although one should normally abjure attempting to predict the future, the Supreme
Court's decision in Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (1999), has potential relevance to the First
Amendment questions that Professor Cate's article raises. In Wilson, the Supreme Court held that
local and federal law enforcement officers could not constitutionally invite media representatives
to participate in "ride along" activities that included filming at the homes of persons subject to a
lawful arrest warrant. See id.
at 1697-99. Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a unanimous court
(at least on this point), explained that the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy precludes law
enforcement officials from facilitating the filming of the execution of arrest warrants over the
objections of the arrestees. "We hold that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to
bring members of the media or third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the
presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant." Id. at 1699.
Along the way, the Court rejected a First Amendment defense of the practice of media ride-alongs,
explaining that "the Fourth Amendment also protects a very important right, and in the present case
it is in terms of that right that the media ride-alongs must be judged." Id. at 1698. On the facts at
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B. The Takings Clause
In the alternative, Professor Cate argues that the Takings Clause would raise
serious constitutional problems for legislation designed to vest individual citizens
with the right to control access to personal information gathered by doctors,
creditors, or educational institutions:
"Data protection regulation may
legitimately prompt takings claims."69 According to Professor Cate, "[a] data
processor exercises property rights in his data because of his investment in
collecting and aggregating them with other useful data."7 He concludes that "[a]
legislative, regulatory, or even judicial determination that denies processors the
right to use their data could very likely constitute a taking and require
compensation."'" All that said, whether or not particular information belongs to
the entity that collects it seems to be something about which reasonable
legislative minds might disagree.72
The Takings Clause only protects property interests; property, in turn, exists
at the sufferance of state governments. The Supreme Court consistently has
refused to recognize property interests arising directly under the Constitution.73
This approach is probably mistaken; if liberty interests arise directly under the

issue in Wilson, the citizen's interest in privacy simply outweighed any First Amendment benefits
that the practice of media ride-alongs might provide. A similar analysis should govern in a case
presenting a challenge to reasonable privacy legislation. See, e.g., Cable News Network v. Noriega,
917 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir.) (balancing CNN's right to broadcast the Noriega tapes against General
Noriega's Sixth Amendment interest in a fair trial), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 976 (1990); cf id at 97677 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from the denial of a writ of certiorari).
69. Id. at 207.
70. Id. at 208.
71. Id.
72. For example, one might assume that one owns her own body, its parts, and the DNA that
controlled the creation of those parts. The California Supreme Court did not so view the matter.
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936
(1991). That said, one could easily imagine a decision going the other way (which is precisely how
the intermediate California appellate court had ruled). See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); see also William Boulier,
Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human
Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693 (1995); Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing
Personality: Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. REV. 209 (1990). The
Takings Clause would not require compensation to either losing party; the state is free to establish
a property right in either the patient or the hospital, and the creation of that property right does not
raise any serious Takings Clause issue. It is possible that the decision might raise substantive due
process concerns if the court's (or legislature's) decision seemed utterly irrational or arbitrary. See
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555 (1997).
73. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that property interests,
unlike liberty interests, arise only by operation of positive law and requiring a would-be plaintiff
to establish a "legitimate claim of entitlement" under existing state law to demonstrate a cognizable
property interest in a government job or benefit).
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Constitution, it stands to reason that the Constitution also should limit the states'
ability to extinguish or define away the existence of property rights.74
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in a variety of contexts, has made clear that
property interests arise only by operation of positive law; what the state giveth,
the state can taketh away (at least prospectively).75
A state legislature could simply pass legislation declaring that no property
interest accrues from the collection of personal data. Thus, if a Kroger elects to
track its customers' grocery purchases, it would be free to do so.76 If it attempted
to assert a regulatory takings claim in response to state legislation prohibiting it
from selling such a list, the claim would fail because the Takings Clause only
applies in instances where a property interest has been implicated.
Indiana is particularly instructive in this regard. For reasons that are nonobvious, the state legislature passed a cap on actual damages resulting from
medical malpractice. No matter what the plaintiff s actual damages, a plaintiff
cannot recover more than $1.25 million.77 The Supreme Court of Indiana
sustained this law on a broad-based constitutional attack, including claims arising
under the due process and equal protection clauses.78
Indiana has effectively revoked the property (or liberty) interest that one has
in physical integrity. The legislature snatched a stick from the citizen's bundle
of property rights (evidently when not many citizens were looking, or at least
failed to appreciate the gravamen ofthis law).79 If positive law can deny a citizen
the ability to recover for damages to her person due to negligence, it seems
logically to follow that the state could define away Kroger's property interest in
its customer database.
Indeed, a sufficiently privacy-loving legislature could go one step further and
enact legislation creating an individual property interest in one's confidential
personal information and authorizing actions for damages when such information
is released without the consent of the person about whom the information relates.
It is easy to imagine such a law.
Consider the parallel fates of Monica Lewinsky, Justice Clarence Thomas,
and Judge Robert Bork. Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr attempted to force
Kramerbooks and Barnes & Noble, two Washington, D.C. bookstores, to disclose

74. See Krotoszynski, supra note 72, at 583-90, 615-25.
75. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); O'Bannon v.
Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773 (1980); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Punikaia
v. Clark, 720 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).
76. Many grocery stores can and do collect data on their customers, most commonly through
"frequent shopper" programs that involve identification cards that permit the store to track a
customer's purchasing patterns. See Lena H. Sun, Checking Out the Customer, WASH. POST, July
9, 1989, at H 1.
77. See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3(a)(3) (1998).
78. See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 598-601 (Ind. 1980); see also
Frank Cornelius, Crushed by My Own Reform, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at A31; Krotoszynski,
supra note 72, at 610 n.344.
79. See Cornelius, supra note 78.
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Ms. Lewinsky's recent purchases."0 Opponents of Justice Thomas's appointment
to the Supreme Court and Judge Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court sought
and obtained information regarding their video rental habits,8 which, in the case
of Justice Thomas, ostensibly included some relatively racy titles.82 A state
legislature could easily conclude that customers of video rental establishments
should be able to assert a privacy claim against the disclosure of their rental
records without consent.83 The Supreme Court probably would not strike down
such legislation on either First Amendment or Takings Clause grounds.
Similarly, an insurance company's claim to a proprietary interest in an insured
person's medical history also is something that a rational state legislature could

reject, probably without encountering serious constitutional difficulties.
Professor Cate responds that the Congress and state legislatures are
powerless to adopt legislation that upsets "reasonable investment-backed
expectations," citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.84 in support of this
proposition.8 5 He fails to mention the Supreme Court's explicit reliance on the
existence of a pre-existing property right under Missouri. law as a necessary
incident of invoking the Takings Clause. As Justice Blackmun explains in
Monsanto,"we are mindful of the basic axiom that 'property interests.., are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source

80. See David Stout, Lewinsky's Bookstore PurchasesAre Now Subject of Subpoena,N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26,1998, at Al (reporting on Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's efforts to force two
Washington, D.C. bookstores to divulge Monica Lewinsky's book purchases over the previous 28
months and the bookstores' decision to fight Star's subpoena); David Streitfeld & Bill Miller,
Starr's Questfor Book Titles Faces High Bar, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1998, at B I (same).
81. See Amitai Etzioni, PrivacyIsn't Dead Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1999, at AS (describing
how Judge Bork's experience led to adoption of the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2710); Michael deCourcy Hinds, PersonalButNot Confidential: A New Debate over Privacy,N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1988, at 56 (providing an account of Judge Bork's experience and the uproar that
followed); Jeffery Yorke, The Call-In People'sCourt, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1991, at C7 (reporting
on rumors that Justice Thomas rented pornographic video tapes from Graffiti's, a Washington, D.C.
video rental store).
82. See Yorke, supra note 81.
83. Indeed, Congress has already passed such legislation in response to Judge Bork's
experience of having his viewing habits put on public display incident to his confirmation hearings.
See The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (providing both criminal and civil
penalties for disclosing any "personally identifiable information" about a video rental store patron
absent the patron's prior written consent). Although case law under the Video Privacy Protection
Act is scant, at least one civil suit has gone forward, without any serious First Amendment
challenge to the law. See Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.J. 1996)
(permitting a civil action pursuant to the Video Privacy Protection Act to move forward against
both a video rental store and third parties who distributed the Dirkes' video rental records).
84. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
85. See Cate, supra note 2, at 173 n.*.
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such as state law."' 86 Thus, Monsanto's takings claim was entirely contingent on
Missouri law affirmatively recognizing a property interest in trade secrets,
including the specific data at issue in the case.
After examining the matter in some detail, Justice Blackmun concludes that
"[w]e therefore hold that to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health,
safety, and environmental data cognizable as a trade secret property right under
Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 8 7 The contingent nature of the takings claim on the substance of
Missouri state law could not be more clear, or more expressly stated. If Missouri
modified its substantive law to abolish the property interest in trade secrets, it
would preclude a takings claim identical to the claim raised by Monsanto for data
assembled after the new law's effective date. The Monsanto Court's subsequent
discussion of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" takes place against
this backdrop of state positive law, and is entirely contingent on Missouri's
decision to recognize a property interest in the data at issue.88
To put the matter in some context, consider Congress's recent decision to
extend the life of copyrights from the life of the author plus fifty years to the life
of the author plus seventy years.8 9 Simply put, in 1998 Congress enacted
legislation extending by twenty years the life of copyrights. If Congress were so
inclined, it could have reduced the term of copyrights to two years, or set the
term at any point it deemed prudent.90 Even if such legislative action upset
"reasonable investment-backed expectations," such a law would not trigger the
Takings Clause, at least insofar as the law purported to have merely prospective
effect. Since 1937, the Supreme Court has not attempted to establish substantive
limits on the powers of the state and federal governments to tinker prospectively
with the content or scope of property rights. Accordingly, adoption of state laws
prospectively limiting the ability of information scalpers to collect and sell
personal information would not exceed the meager limits imposed on such
policies by the substantive aspect of the Due Process clause. 9

86. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 166 (1980)). Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,Inc., in turn, quoted language from
Board ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
87. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
88. See id. at 1004-16.
89. Compare the 1976 version of 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) ("Copyright in a work created on or
after January 1, 1978 subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following
subsections, endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the author's
death."), with 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. IV 1998) ("Copyright in a work created on or after January
1, 1978 subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for
a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death.")
90. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have the power... [t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
91. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that economic liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process clause precluded New York from adopting health and safety
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To be sure, it is certainly possible that market mechanisms might incent
video rental stores or bookstores to promise confidentiality in order to attract
privacy-minded customers.92 Nevertheless, the citizenry should not be forced to
rely solely on the market to protect its privacy interests. After all, neither the
First Amendment nor the Takings Clause is a mutual suicide pact. Properly
understood, neither provision presents a serious impediment to the adoption of
reasonable privacy legislation.93
C. ConditionalSpending and Privacy Rights
Let us suppose, for the moment, that one would be wrong to think that the
First Amendment and/or the Takings Clause, properly construed, would permit
a state to adopt legislation protecting the privacy interests of its citizens. Even
if one supposes that the First Amendment and/or the Takings Clause preclude
direct privacy protections, a sufficiently privacy-loving state government (or the
federal government) could nevertheless prevent a good deal of private
information from being commodified and sold like bags of potatoes.94
When the government elects to subsidize the delivery of particular goods or
services, it may condition its willingness to do business with potential providers
of goods or services on those providers agreeing to particular terms or conditions.
For example, the receipt of federal family planning funds might be conditioned
on the recipient clinic refusing to provide any meaningful information about
abortion services.95 Similarly, the decision to fund particular kinds of art does

regulations governing maximum weekly hours of employment in abakery); Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921) (invoking the Due Process clause to impose substantive limits on Arizona's ability
to define the scope of property rights associated with ownership of a restaurant).
92. Scott McNealy, chairman and CEO of Sun Microsystems, has stated publicly that "[y]ou
already have zero privacy-get over it." Etzioni, supra note 81, at 27. If Mr. McNealy's approach
is representative of the Internet industry's attitudes toward privacy issues, I seriously question
whether reliance on market mechanisms will prove sufficient to protect reasonable privacy
expectations. See, e.g., Streitfeld, supra note 4.
93. Indeed, the Clinton administration has recently issued proposed regulations governing
access to individual medical records. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999); see also Robert Pear, Clinton to Unveil
Rules to Protect Medical Privacy,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1999, at Al ("The Proposed regulations
would be the first comprehensive Federal standards specifically intended to protect the
confidentiality of medical records."). The President proposed the new rules because Congress
failed to meet a self-imposed statutory deadline for enacting legislation in this area. See Pear,
supra. The proposed rules have proven controversial, and their ultimate fate remains uncertain.
See Robert Pear, Rules on Privacy of PatientData Stir Hot Debate,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at
Al.
94. See generally Berman & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 571-79.
95. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1412 (1989); cf William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
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not imply that the government must fund all kinds of art.96
The federal and state governments are among the largest purchasers of
medical services. Literally billions of dollars pass through the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. Either the federal or a state government could condition
participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs on respecting the privacy
interests of plan participants, perhaps by not disclosing patient information to
third parties without prior patient consent. A health care provider who wished
to create and sell patient lists would remain free to do so, provided, of course,
that it did not take Medicare or Medicaid funds.
A similar sort of arrangement protects student grade and disciplinary records
from public disclosure. If I were to locate and publish Dan and Marilyn Quayle's
transcripts from this law school, the law school's continued participation in all
federal educational programs would be jeopardized (notably including student
loan programs).
All of this is a rather round about way of saying that, if government has the
will to protect confidential personal information, multiple avenues of potential
relief exist. The failure of the federal and state governments to protect such
information adequately to date has a great deal more to do with the lobbying
power of those who profit by trading in such information than with the weakness
of the legal tools at the government's disposal.
III. THE NEED TO RETHINK THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY IN
THE CONTEXT OF PRIVACY RIGHTS

At a more theoretical level, Professor Cate's article raises, rather squarely,
the age old question of precisely where to draw the line between the government
and the private sector. Historically, the private sector has been free to disregard
the constitutional limitations applicable to the government. Thus, the City of
Indianapolis could not fire an employee for subscribing to the political goals of
the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws ("NORML"),
whereas IBM could do so. The theory behind this result is that the state presents
a far greater threat to liberty than does the private sector.
If the Framers had foreseen the advent of Microsoft, one might question
whether they would have created a system that assumes that only the government
is the enemy of liberty.97 As Professor Owen Fiss has argued in various contexts,
in contemporary times, the state can be as much the friend of individual liberty
as its enemy.9" This is doubly so when one contrasts government efforts to
enhance personal liberty through progressive legislation with the libertysquelching behavior of large corporate interests. 99
At least arguably, the creation of new and vast capabilities to create and

96. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
97. See Wilborn, supra note 54, at 828-31, 864-76.
98. See Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner,26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. I (1992).
99. See Scott Edwin Sundby, Is Abandoning State Action Asking Too Much of the
Constitution?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139, 144 n. I I (1989).
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disseminate data make the private sphere even more potentially threatening to
individual liberty." ° If this is so, legal academics, judges, and legislators should
rethink the wisdom of limiting basic privacy protections to the government. Of
course, the extension of privacy protections to non-state actors, like Anthem or
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, would require positive legislation. If the community
concludes that the principal contemporary threat to individual liberty is the
collection and dissemination of intensely personal information by private
information brokers, then it would be entirely appropriate to rethink the wisdom
of maintaining the public/private distinction in this particular area.

CONCLUSION

I am not a great fan of the new information age-I am not yet convinced that
"faster, cheaper, better" will mean that we live qualitatively better, more
fulfilling lives.'' Professor Cate's article presents a rather nightmarish scenario
in which our very souls can be digitized, commodified, and sold to the highest
bidder. If this is truly the import of the information age, one should question
whether we are not losing a great deal more than we are gaining in the bargain.
Nevertheless, there is no stopping the information revolution. China has
tried and failed. 2 The ubiquity of technology means that, like it or not, we will
all have to readjust our lives to accommodate new technological realities. One
must hope, however, that the federal courts resist the temptation to "Lochner-ize"
the info-bahn.
Some of the arguments contained in Professor Cate's article could be
deployed in an attempt to use the First Amendment and Takings Clause to create
a kind of constitutional "liberty of contract" for information service brokers. Just
as industrial production and the benefits of economies of scale led capitalists at
the turn of the last century to reject social welfare legislation as an untenable
interference with freedom of contract, it appears likely that similar arguments
will be mustered on behalf of the information brokers. Just as the federal courts
eventually came to realize that laws protecting men, women, and children from
dangerous or unfair terms and conditions of employment were not
unconstitutional, let us hope that federal and state courts do not interpose the Bill
of Rights to thwart legislation and common law precedents designed to check the
worst abuses of the new information brokers.
Markets failed to protect labor at the turn of the last century. There is every
reason to believe that markets will fail to protect privacy at the turn of this

100. See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 563-68.
101. See ANDREWS, supra note 18, at 248-60 (arguing that new biological technologies,
including cloning, are not inherently beneficial or harmful, but require careful debate about ethics
and culture before they are embraced).
102. See Scott E. Feir, Comment, Regulations Restricting lnternetAccess: Attempted Repair
ofRupture in China's Great Wall Restraining the Free Exchange ofIdeas, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y
J. 361 (1997).
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century. History teaches that if there is money to be made by collecting highly
personal information and selling itto the highest bidder, someone will undertake
to provide this service-absent some legal impediment to doing so. Let us hope
that the federal and state courts will take a lesson from the past and embrace,
rather than reject, progressive legislation aimed at securing a modicum of
personal privacy in the new information age.

